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I. INTRODUCTION AND GOAL OF THE DIRECTIVE
The situation for private equity companies has been improving again after
the financial crisis, which led to the breakdown of M&A transactions. Low
interest rates, potentially high growth of target companies and ringing cash
tills attract new transactions. However, there are downsides: since attractive
take-over targets are rare, high competition could lead to an increase in sales
prices for potential target companies.' Also, regulatory insecurity is still high
due to the Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) Directive,2 which
was passed in November 2010. The legislative procedure for this regulatory
proposal is oriented by the Lamfalussy Procedure.' The first stage was
completed with the coming into force of the AIFM directive, followed by
implementing rules in the second stage. The ESMA (successor to the CESR)
published these rules under authority of the EU Commission on July 13, 2011,
in a comprehensive advisory document.' Numerous implementing rules are
concretized in this document, and presented for discussion. The ESMA's final
recommendations were provided on November 16, 2011. In the third stage, the
ESMA passed recommendations and guidelines.' The requirements for private
equity firms and hedge funds are only legally binding after the Directive's
national implementing statutes come into force by July 22, 2013. Private
equity firms should create a competitive advantage for themselves against
1. Sebastian Jost, Wird Deutschland :ur "Kampfzone" flir Firmenjiger?, DIE WELT (Ger ),
Feb 5, 2011, http://www.welt.dc/wirtschaft/articlcl2457138/Wird-Dcutschland-zur-Kampfzone-fucr-
Firmenjacger.htmi.
2. Directive 201 1/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council v. 8 June 2011 on the
manager of alternative investment funds and to amend Directive 2003/41/LC and 2009/65/EC and
Regulation (EC) Nr 1060/2009 and (EU) Nr. 1095/2010, Abl. 2011, Nr L 174, 1 [hereinafter AIFM
directive].
3 Martin Weber, Die Entwicklung des Kapitalmarktrechts om Jahre 2010, NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFr 273, 274 (2011) (Ger.). For the Lamfalussy Procedure, see Thomas M.J Mbllers,
Europdische Methoden- und Gesetzgebungslehre im Kapitalnarktrecht, Vollharmonisierung,
Generalklauseln and soft law im Rahmen des Lanfalussy-Verfahrens als Mittel zur Etablierung von
Standards, ZFITSCHRIFT FUR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 480 (2008) (Ger); Klaus U. Schmolke, Der
Lamfalussi-Prozess in Europischen Kapitalmarktrecht - eine Zwischenbilanz, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 912 (2005) (Ger.).
4 ESMA, Consultation paper, ESMA's draft technical advice to the European Commission on
possible implementing measuresofthe Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, ESMA'2011/209
v. 13.7.2011, available at: http //www.sma.curopa.cu/popup2.phpid=7625.
5. Thomas M.J. Mollers, Sources of Law in European Securities Regulation--Effective Regulation,
Sof Law and Legal Taxonomy froin Lanifalussv to de Larosiere, 11 EUROPF4N BUS. ORGANIZATION L.
REv. 385 (2010)
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rival funds by an optimum implementation of necessary compliance measures
even before the national statutes come into effect.'
Generally speaking, there are three starting points for the regulation of
alternative investment funds: the financial product, the investors, and the
managers. The AIFM directive starts with the managers of alternative
investment funds. The directive's goal is both investor protection and
functional protection of the capital market.! Balancing these two goals is a
great challenge for the legislature, particularly due to the directive's great
scope of application, which leads to many different persons concerned
needing special rules. The legislature needs to consider to what extend
investors in ALFs are in need of protection, since they mostly act
professionally-which could mean that systemic protection of capital markets
is generally more important.
This paper first explains who is affected by the AIFM directive (II.). It
then introduces and evaluates the directive's regulating means (III.), focusing
on those that are particularly relevant for private equity managers. After
presenting the directive's legal consequences (IV.), the paper concludes with
an outlook (V.).
II. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE AIFM DIRECTIVE
1. Differentiation from the UCITS Directive
In many instances, the AIEFM directive draws on already known rules
from the UCITS directive, for example on the concept of a common European
authorization,' a management company's minimum capital requirements' and
6. Id. at 379, 402; Thomas M.J. Mollcrs, Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europaischen
Finanzmarktaufsichtsstruktur-Ein systematischer Vergleich der Rating- VO (EG) Nr. 1060/2009 mit der
geplanten ESMA-VO, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 285, 288f (2010) (Ger.).
7 Ulf Klebeck, Neue Richthniejir Verwalter von alternativen Investmentfonds?, DEUTSC IES
STEUERRECHT 2154, 2154 (2009).
8. An authorization is valid in all member states, see directive 2009/65/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), Council Directive
2009/65/EC art. 5, para. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 32, 45 [hereinafter UCITS] and Position of the European
Parliament adopted at first reading on 11 November 2010 with a view to the adoption of Directive
2011/.../EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and
amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No. 1060/2009 and (EU) No.
1095/2010 art. 6, para. 1.
9. The requirements concerning an administrative company's minimum capital according to
UCITS, art. 7 para. I are identical with the ones according to AIFM directive 2011/61, art. 6, para. 2,
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the introduction of a depository.'0 Like the UCITS directive, the AIFM
directive generally covers all entities, which are set out for a common
investment of gathered capital. UCITS entities gather their capital from a
broad public and invest it in securities and solvent financial means in
accordance with the principle of risk distribution. Alternative Investment
Funds (AIFs), on the other hand, are defined more broadly in terms of
investment and raising of capital: "A number of investors" is sufficient as
financier, and a "defined investment policy" suffices for investing." Contrary
to the UCITS directive, an AIF is not required to allow anytime withdrawals
or cashing of investors' capital contributions.
The directive's scope includes all AIF managers registered in the EU,
regardless of whether the managed fund is headquartered in the EU as well.12
The directive is applicable to funds that are managed from non-EU
headquarters if the fund manages or markets AIFs registered in the EU." This
broad scope of application closes potential loopholes and lowers the risk of a
regulatory arbitrage. The directive does not, however, differentiate between
a public and non-public marketing, as does the German Investment Act.14
2. Factual Scope ofApplication
Not the fund itself, but its admission, on-going activities and management
transparency are the objects of the regulatory efforts." Only corporate bodies
whose regular business it is to manage one or more AIFs are suitable as
potential managers of alternative investment funds.'
The European legislature also included a de minimis rule. The directive's
rules only partially apply to AIF managers if, due to leverage effects, the
managed investments lie below 100 million euros. " If the funds administered
by the AIF themselves are not leveraged, the threshold value is 500 million
including the additional requiremcnts for portfolios exceeding 250 million curos.
10. Both UCITS , art. 22 and AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 21, para. 8 require asset
transferral to a depository.
I1. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art 4 § I (a)(i), 2011 OJ. (L 174) 16 (EU).
12. Id. at art. 2 § 1(a)
13 Id at art 2 § 1(b)-(c).
14 Marketing, according to the German Investment Act, is "any measure by the provider of fund
shares (or his employees) or by an independent sales agent to promote sales," see JOHANNEs KONDGEN,
INVESTMENTGESETZ INVESTMENTSTEUERGESETz, § 2, margin no. 68 (Hanno Berger, Kai-Uwe Streck &
Dieter Libbehusen eds , 2010).
15. AlFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 1.
16. Id at art. 4§ 1(b).
17. Id. at art. 3 § 2(a).
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euros.'" As far as private equity funds are concerned, the 500 million euros
threshold will generally apply, since the leverage financing of the fund itself
and not the financing of the target company is relevant."
Among others, holding companies are excluded by the directive. The
same is true for entities already included in the Directive on the Activities and
Supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision, for
supranational institutions, family offices, central banks and governmental
funds supporting social security and pension systems.2 ' These exceptions
should be appreciated. Family offices, for instance, do not invest investors'
money but aim at private productive investments. Consequently, the MiFiD
system of regulation applies." There are no exceptions or simplifications
included for professional investors, since the directive specifically assumes
marketing to professional or institutional investors.2 2 The directive's drafts
were unclear about the application for closed funds;23 however, the final
version explicitly includes them. 24 Thus, a loop hole in protection is closed,
concerning closed funds which operate mostly unregulated on the grey capital
market. Before, closed funds were not included in the application scope of the
German Securities Trading Act. In addition to the AIFM directive, the German
legislator on February 16, 2011 published a discussion paper to amend the
Investment Broker and Investment Act.25 If amended, the new law would
broaden the term "financial instrument" to include closed funds.
Consequently, the Securities Trading Act and the Credit Services Act would
apply to these funds as well. Thus, two new means of regulation will have to
be considered for closed funds, and in order to avoid overlaps and over-
regulation, a coordinated procedure is highly necessary.
18. Id. at art. 3 § 2(b).
19. Id. at art. 3 § 2(b); see also ULF KLEBECK, NEUE *RICHTLINIE FUR VERWALTER VON
ALTERNATIVEN INVESTMENTFONDS?, 2154, 2156, 2160 (Deutschcs Stcucrrecht 2009).
20. Id. at art. 2 § 3.
21. CHRISTOPH KUMPAN, KAPITALMARKTRECHTS-KOMMENTAR, § 2, margin no. 93 (Eberhard
Schwark & Daniel Zimmer eds., 2010); ANDREAS 0. KHNE & MAXI EBERHARDT, ERLAUBNISPFLICHT
EINES "FAMILY OFFICE" UNTER BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DES NEUEN FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSTATBESTANDES
DER ANLAGEBERATUNG 133 (Zcitschrift flir Bank- und Kapitalmarktrccht 2008).
22. See AIFM directive, supra note 2, at recital 15, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 3 (EU).
23. SEBASTIAN KIND & STEPHAN A. HAAG, DER BEGRIFF DES ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND
NACH DER AIFM-RICHTLINIE-GESCHLOSSENE FONDS UND PRIVATE VERMOGENSANLAGEGESELLSCHAFTEN
IM ANWENDUNGSBEREICH?, 1526, 1529 et seq. (Deutsches Steuerrecht 2010), criticizes the scope of
application as too vague and broad.
24. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 2 § la(a).
25. Entwurf cines Gesetzes zur Novellierung des Finanzanlagenvermittler- und
Vermbgensanlagenrechtsv.6.6.2011,BT-Drucks. 17/6051, available athttp://www.kaptialmarktrecht-im-
internet.dc.
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III. REGULATING INSTRUMENTS
1. Authorization of an AIFM
The AIFMs regulated by the directive may only manage alternative
investment funds after prior authorization by the competent national
regulatory agency.2 ' The AIFM must apply for such authorization with the
competent agency, for example the BaFin (Bundesanstalt flr
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) in
Germany. In addition to some information concerning the management, the
names of all shareholders with "qualifying holdings" must be published in
order to show potential conflicts of interest.28 According to the legislature,
"qualifying holdings" are any direct or indirect share of at least 10% of an
AIFM's capital or voting rights. 2 The authorization request is required to
include information on the compensation policies and the organizational
structure.30 Furthermore, the AIFM needs to inform the national agency about
the strategies pursued and potential use of leverage, as well as the risk profiles
of such leverage.3 The agency then examines whether the applicant is capable
of fulfilling the conditions as set out in the directive, and whether the
responsible person has sufficient experience concerning the strategies
pursued, including a good reputation.3 2 It remains to be seen whether this
examination will be one of mere formality. According to Art. 8(l)(a) of the
AIFM directive, the agencies must be persuaded that the AIFMs can fulfil
certain material requirements. This argues in favor of a material examination.
Even today, the BaFin examines professional qualification and knowledge
when appointing a member for an administrative or supervising body
according to the Credit Services Act.3 Material scrutiny, however, is an
26. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 4(1).
27. Id. at art. 5(1).
28. Id at art. 6(1).
29. Id. at art. 4(a)-(h).
30. Id at art. 5(2).
31. Id. at art. 5(3).
32. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 4(1).
33 Cf § 24 Abs. I Nr. I Kreditwesengesetz [Credit Services Act] (Ger.); see also Ulrich Braun in
& 24 in margin no. 51 et seq in KREDITWESENGESETz (Karl-Heinz Boos, Reinfrid Fischer & Hermann
Schulte-Mattler eds., 3d ed. 2008): Rainer SuBmann, § 24 mnargin no. 8 in KREDITWESENGESETZ (Andreas
Schwennickc & Dirk Auerbach eds., 2009) (Personal reliability and professional competence are required
for operating a bank, § 32 sec. I s. 2). On the requirement of professional competence, see Rcinfrid Fischer,
§ 33 margin no. 39 in KREDIT WESLNGESETZ KOMMENTAR zu KWG UND AUSFUHRUNGSVORSCHRIFTFN
[Vol. 30:8792
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exception for the BaFin's measures and can easily overwhelm the particular
agency's competences both in qualitative and temporal ways.34 In order to be
authorized, the AIFM must be equipped with sufficient starting capital, which
is at least 300.000 Euros" for an internally administered AIF." Also, an
externally administered company can be appointed as manager, as opposed to
AIFs with internal management." Since the administration is separated from
the AIF itself, the risk for conflicts of interest is lower. Consequently,
externally administered AIFs have a lower minimum capital requirement of
only 125.000 Euros.n If the administered fund's value exceeds 250 million
Euros, the AIF has to supply additional equity capital of 0.02% of the
additional fund volume, but no more than 10 million Euros. 39 A successful
authorization will be valid in all EU member states.40 The requirements for
equity capital and the concept of a uniform European authorization already
comply with the rules known from the UCITS directive.4
2. Guidelines for Conflicts ofInterest and Compensation
The AIFM directive presents general guidelines to guarantee the
necessary expertise and administrative accuracy. Along with the limitation on
conflicts of interest,4 2 an appropriate compensation for the management is
important as well. The compensation policy is to be "consistent with an
effective risk management" and should "not encourage risk-taking."43 What
(Karl-Heinz Boos, Reinfrid Fischer & Hermann Schulte-Mattler eds., 2008).
34. Wcrtpapicrprospektgesetz [WpPG] [German Securities Prospectus Act], June 22, 2005,
BUINDESGESTZBLATT [BGBL. i] at 1698, as amended by Artikel 4 des Gesetzes vom 22, § 13 (Get.)
(requiring only an audit of completeness, coherence and comprehensibility); see also Wertpapiererwerbs-
und -ilbernahmegesetz [WpOG] [German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act], Jan. 1, 2002,
ELEKTRONISCHER BUNDESANZEIGER [EBANZ.] at art 14 § 2 (Ger.); Corinna Ritz & Thorsten Vo8, in
WERTPAPIERPROSPEKTGESETZ UND Eu-PROSPEKTVERORDNUNG: WPPG § 13 n.34 (Clemens Just, Thorsten
Vo8, Corinna Ritz & Michael E. Zcising eds., 2009); Eberhard Scydel, in KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZuM
WPUG § 14 n.37 (Heribert Hirte & Christoph von Biilow eds, 2010)
35. For an internally administered AlF, the AlF itself serves as AlFM. See AIFM directive, recital
101. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at recital 54.
36. Id. at art. 6(a)(1).
37. See id. at recital (10).
38. Id. at art. 6(a)(2). Note, however, that this article contains no further requirements
39. Id at art. 6(a)(3).
40. Id at art. 6(1).
41. An authorization is valid in all member states. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 6, at
art. 6.
42. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 10.
43. Id.
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this means exactly remains to be determined by the ESMA. It may be that
compensation needs to be oriented by long-term success as is the case in the
German Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation."
A limitation of compensation by means of a horizontal sectorial comparison
does not appear to be justified, as the characteristics differ greatly and are
therefore not easily compared.45 It is also unclear how to differentiate between
various conflicts of interest and what administrative means can do to help
avoid them.
Conflicts of interest can appear between the fund's administration
(AIFM) and the fund (AIF), but also between the AIFM and the fund
investors. The directive also foresees conflicts between the fund and its
investors or in a horizontal relationship.4 6 The Commission has not yet
specified potential conflicts of interest;" however, the UCITS implementing
directive, published in 2010, provides some clues.48 In the directive, the
Commission aims mainly at the relationship between portfolio management
and UCITS, and accordingly, the administration is prohibited from gaining
financial advantages and avoiding financial deficits burdening the UCITS.49
Furthermore, no services shall be performed for other clients if they do not
comply with the interests of the administered UCITS or are connected with
opposing incentives, financial or otherwise." Similar and further-reaching
requirements are to be expected concerning the AIFM directive. The
differentiation between the situations of conflict and the development of
definite requirements to avoid them are welcomed in particular on the level of
fund management. Potential misconduct can lead to significant financial
losses, in particular in the AIFM's relationship to the AIF and its investors,
since administrative decisions are of potential concern to most investors. The
AIFM's necessary authorization and the periodical audits enable only a
workable supervision and avoidance of conflicts of interest, especially
44. For the Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation (Gcsetz zur
Angemcssenhcit der Vorstandsvcrgutung: VorsAG), see Holger Fleischer, Das Gcsei: our Angeniessenhet
der Vorstandsvergiilung (VorstAG), NEUE ZEil SC HRIFT FUR GESELLSC HAFTSRF( HT, 2009, at 801, 802.
45 A vertical comparison does not make much sense for AlFMs due to the different levels of
responsibility and decisional power
46. Id at art. 10(1).
47. See id at art. 10(4)(a).
48. See generallv Commission Directive 2010/43, implementing Directive 2009/65/1 C of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements, conflicts of interest,
conduct of business, risk management and content of the agreement between a depositary and a
management company, 2010 O.J. (L 176) 42 (EU).
49. See id. at art. 17(1)(a).
50. See id. at art 17(1)(b)-(c).
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concerning fund administration. The differentiation between situations of
conflict concerning the UCITS directive appears transferrable to the AIFM
directive. It remains to be seen if the differentiation and naming of specific
conflicts actually help to avoid them; this depends mostly on effective
monitoring and implementation, which are to be addressed more in depth.
3. Organizational Requirements
The requirements concerning risk and liquidity management, from the
outset, remain just as vague. Besides portfolio management, risk management
is the main task for an AIF's administrator. Conflicts of interest can appear
between these two tasks. Typically, portfolio management will apply yield
pressure to risk management. To minimize this conflict from the start, the
AIFM is required to functionally and hierarchically separate risk and portfolio
management so as to ensure supervision that is as independent as possible."
Furthermore, an "appropriate" system of risk and liquidity management is to
be installed. This includes carrying out of regular due diligence inspections,
the goal of which is to determine and monitor the risks connected with
investments. Additionally, stress tests are to reveal the administered funds'
potential liquidity risks.52 In practice, these measures can detect
misappropriated funds earlier." The detailed requirements for liquidity and
risk management are yet to be determined by the Commission.54
The AIFM directive, therefore, primarily sets out only a frame of
reference which needs to be filled by the ESMA and the Commission. It
remains to be seen to what extent the specified measures fulfil the goal of a
functioning capital market and investor protection. Already, however, it is
clear that workloads are increasing and costs are rising as a result of the
directive's provisions," such as through the requirement that all assets
51. See AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. I1(1).
52. Id. at art. 12(l).
53. Cases such as the Madoff scandal in the United States or that of Kiener in Germany would have
been detected earlier or completely prevented. In the Kicner case, German hedge fund manager Helmut
Kiener used investors' money to facilitate a Ponzi schemc. See Von Agnes Schonberger, Der Fall Kiener:
Gericht rollt Schneeballsystem auf, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Mar. 2, 2011, available at
http://fa7.net/s/RubA5A53ED802AB47C6AFC5F33A9EIAA7 I F/Doc-ECF3C960D3D8847ED873477
B47CO2307E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.htmi.
54. See AlFM directive, supra note 2, at arts 11(5), 12(3)
55. An increasing cost pressure was criticized from the beginning. See Klebeck, supra note 7, at
2154, 2160.
952011]
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undergo independent periodical valuations.16 These types of valuations take
place at least once a year for closed funds, and can be undertaken either by an
external evaluator or by the AIFM itself. An internal valuation must be
performed by an authority independent of portfolio management and
compensation policy. 7 An internal examination seems hardly attractive,
however, because a redundant external valuation might be necessary if so
requested by the appropriate agency." It remains unclear why the valuation
is measured by the fund's structure instead of the investment's volatility. The
investment object itself is relevant for a necessary and useful periodical
valuation, not the differentiation between closed and open funds. While a
frequently renewed valuation may seem useful for volatile investments, its
benefit is questionable in, for example, the acquisition of a medium-sized
close corporation. A valuation that is independent of the assets is advisable
instead. However, the resulting additional costs of periodic valuations will
hardly be avoided.
4. Transparency Duties
a) Annual Report
The duty to create an annual report for the administered AIFs registered
or distributed in the EU lies at the center of the new transparency
requirements. This report is to be communicated to the national agency within
six months, as well as to the investors as requested.59 The agency needs to be
informed not only about a verified closing balance and a list of gains and
expenses, but also about "material changes" of the information originally
distributed to the investors."o This includes, for example, the fund's investing
strategy, its assessment procedure and increased fees. The AIFM's duties of
disclosure toward the agency go far beyond the yearly report, though. For
example, the national agency is to be informed frequently about the most
important markets and instruments in which the managed funds are involved.'
Mainly, the "greatest risks and risk concentrations" are to be addressed. 2
56. See Commission Directive 2010 art. 16
57. Id at art. 16(3)-(4).
58. See id at art 19(9).
59. Id at art. 22(l).
60 Id at art 22(2)
61. Id. at art 24(1).
62 AIFM directive, supra notc 2. at art. 24.
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Additionally, the AIFM has to report investments that are difficult to liquidate,
the current risk profile, and the results of stress tests." At the end of each
quarter, the competent national agency receives a detailed list of all alternative
investment funds managed by the AIFM.64 Further information can be
requested at any time "where necessary for the effective monitoring of
systemic risks."" This information is very valuable. On the one hand, it is the
basis for an early detection of risk concentration and systemic dangers by the
regulatory authorities. On the other hand, the regulatory authorities can
strengthen investor protection by revealing suspicious investment structures.
b) Transparency Requirements for Acquisitions
The AIFM directive provides other transparency rules that affect private
equity investors in particular. These are special rules for the acquisition of
non-listed companies. As known from § 21 Securities Trading Act, the
competent authority needs to be informed if certain threshold values are
passed. If an AIF reaches a share of 10%, 20%, or 30% of voting rights, the
agency is to be informed within 10 workdays.67 A duty for publication, as the
Securities Trading Act requires towards the investors, does not exist. It is
unclear why investors of non-listed companies are regarded as less worthy of
protection. One reason could be that the investors of a non-listed company are
not subject to as big an information deficit as the small investors of listed
companies." The non-listed company and its shareholders only need to be
informed after the fund has taken over.69 The information thresholds provided
in the Securities Trading Act serve both market functionality and investor
protection, help to provide more transparency for take-over attempts and avoid
creeping takeovers." The Securities Trading Act's intention to protect cannot
63 Id at art. 24(2).
64. Id. at art. 24(3)(b).
65 Id. at art. 24(5).
66. Regrouping of investors' money alone, for example, is considered a suspicious investment
structure. In the Kiener case, the KI Global Sub Trust invested in a hedge fund called Nauticus, which in
turn, only invested in KI. Information about the main shareholders would have brought this circle to light.
See Schdnberger, supra note 53.
67. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 27(1).
68. For information on this phenomenon, also known as the "prisoners' dilemma,' see THOMAS M.J.
MOLLERS, in KOLNER KOMMENTAR ZUM WPOG, § 23, margin no. 2 (Heribert Hirte & Christoph von
Biilow eds., 2010).
69. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 27(2).
70. KLAUS-DIETER DEHLINGER & MARTIN ZIMMERMANN, Vor §, 21 bis 30, in
WERTPAPIERHANDELSGESETZ: WPHG, margin no. 21-22 (Andreas Fuchs ed., 2009); Holger Fleischer &
972011]1
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easily be transferred to the AIFM directive, as no market that is worthy of
protection exists with non-listed companies. Attempts to take over listed
companies usually lead to market distortion, which negatively affects
investors' trust, and are therefore dangerous to the market's functionality.
These distortions cannot happen where non-listed companies are concerned.
The duties of disclosure connected to the information thresholds apply only
in relation to the agency until the take-over has taken place. A direct
protection of markets and investors is not intended. The directive does not
provide which measures the agency can take. As long as the target company
and its investors need only be informed after the fund's take-over, the creeping
takeover of alternative investment funds cannot effectively be avoided. If the
information remains accessible only to the agency, such monitoring can at the
most meet systemic risks, which can hardly be determined from the threshold
values alone. It is not clear how the thresholds provided in Art. 27 AIFM
directive are to further functioning protection of markets or investor
protection.
c) Duties of Disclosure When Acquiring Control
The transparency requirements are complemented by another duty of
disclosure if the fund acquires control through a share of more than 50%. In
this case, the AIFM has to inform the listed company, its shareholders and the
competent agency about the situation resulting from voting rights, the
conditions resulting in the take-over and the date of control acquisition." Due
to its timing, this duty of disclosure is of only an informative character for the
investors. It is too late for potential attempts of resistance. Further information
includes the name of the responsible AIFM, the strategy to avoid and channel
conflicts of interest, as well as details about the intended external and internal
communication policy concerning the company and its employees.72
Furthermore, the fund's administration has to encourage the executive board
to forward the information to the employees' representatives.
Klaus U. Schmolke, Das Anschlechen an une borsennotierte Aktiengesellschaft Uberlegungen zur
Betedigungstransparenzdeia lege lata undde legejerenda, NEUEZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT
[NZG] 401, 409 (2009) (Ger ); HERIBERT HIR FE, § 21, in KOLNER KO\11ENTAR ZUM WPHG, margin no.
4 (Heribert Hirte & Thomas M. M611crs eds, 2007) (Ger).
71. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 27(3).
72. Id. at art. 28(3).
73. Id. at art. 27(4). A duty of disclosure for the employees' representation is already known from
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, § 10 sec. 5 and is meant to help involve employees in the
tendering procedure at an early stage, see Marcel Grobys, § 10 in WERFPAPIERERWERBS- UND
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Only the company and its employees' representatives, not the agency,
need to be informed about the intentions concerning business processing and
the foreseen effects it has on the employees.74 This appears justified, as the
regulatory agency is not competent to oversee employees' rights. Not only the
AIFM, but also companies taken over by alternative investment funds, are
subject to additional transparency requirements. The company or the AIFM
must give account at least about the "situation at the end of the time covered
by the annual report" and "a fair review of the development of the company's
business... ."" Furthermore, "any important events" taking place after the end
of the business year need to be mentioned and the company's expected
development shown.7 6 These additional publication duties not only lead to
increased costs, but also to potential competitive disadvantages for the
companies taken over by the AIFM.
5. Asset Stripping"
As urged by the European Parliament, Art. 29a AIFM directive introduces
a rule particularly applicable to private equity managers. Private equity has
undisputed advantages, but the fact that the acquired company's management
is oriented by short-term success also poses a problem." This rule intends to
prevent a company's asset stripping after a private equity investor takes over.
The investor pulls assets out of the company without regard to its long-term
success. In particular, the AIFM may neither encourage a capital reduction nor
re-buy its own shares or encourage the shares' sale within twenty-four months
after having acquired control of the target company. These measures aim to
avoid take-over only for reasons of short-term profit maximization.
OBERNAHMEGESETZ (WPOG) KOMMENTAR, margin no. 82 (Stephan Gcibel & Rainer Siilmann eds., 2d
ed. 2008) (Ger.).
74. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 28(3).
75. Id at art. 29(2).
76. Id at art. 29(2)(a) b).
77. See id at art. 30. Asset "stripping" is a technical term. The German term "Ausschlachten" has
a negative connotation. The neutral English term appears more appropriate and could have been translated
differently.
78. MICHAEL MULLER, Hedgefonds und Private Equity-Fluch oder Segen, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
BANK- UND KAPITALMARKTRECHT 351, 352 (2008) (Ger.). According to Walter, the advantages ofprivate
equity are a positive effect on market liquidity, a decrease of volatility, the taking of risk positions,
decrease of inefficiencies and, in particular in the beginning to an enterprise, the central financing source.
These arc met by the danger of market intransparency and large amount of outside capital which endanger
the financial market's stability.
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Negative experiences in the past (such as the take-over of Hugo Boss by
Permira or ProSiebenSatI by KKR)7" shine a positive light on this rule." If a
company is acquired only to strip it of its assets, this is contrary to the other
shareholders' interests. However, Art. 29a AIFM directive poses an immense
intrusion into the main shareholders property rights. There are situations in
which this hinders an economically reasonable adjustment of capital
structure.8 ' On the one hand, this intrusion is limited to two years. On the
other hand it is also limited factually and does not prohibit all capital
measures, but only those going beyond certain threshold values defined in Art.
29a(2) AIFM directive. These limitations lessen the intensity of the intrusion.
6. Duties ofthe Custodian Bank
In order to avoid conflicts of interest between the safekeeping and
management of the investors' assets, the AIFM directive finally introduces a
mandatory safekeeping of all assets by an independent deposit facility, the
custodian bank. An AIFM must appoint in writing a custodian for every AIF.82
The bank's main task is to monitor the AIF's cashflows and post them
accordingly." To avoid conflicts of interest, the custodian may not serve the
AIFM itself. Furthermore, the custodian must follow strict rules if it intends
to delegate its tasks to others.84 The AIFM directive also provides a
comprehensive liability for the custodian. Similar to § 29 of the German
Investment Act, Art. 18a( 11) AIFM directive introduces an independent claim
for reimbursement both for the AIF and its investors. Usually, investors' rights
are exercised by the AIFM." Since the burden of proof lies with the custodian
and since the custodian is liable even for negligent breach of duty, this claim
is very effective in terms of investor protection. However, the increased duties
79. For example, the financial investor Permira cashed out 300 million curos shortly after taking
control. See Susanne Prcuss, Permira Kam, sah undnahm, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, (Mar. 13,
2008). available at http://www.faz.nct,,;,Rub4D8A76D29ABA43699D9E59CO413A582C/Doc-E5CE
163783C504CEFBOFF90E8F8A89E65-ATpl~EcommonScontent.html.
80. For a detailed work on creditor protection for take-overs financed with outside capital, see
FLORIAN HOLZNER, PRIVATE EQUITY, DER EINSATZ VON FREMDKAPITAL UND GLAUBIGERSCHUTz, EINE
UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR NOTWENDIGKEIT UND ZU DEN MOGLICHKEITEN EINER GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTLICHEN
REGULIERUNG FREMDFINANZIERT FR UNTERNEHMENSTRANSAKTIONEN (LEVERAGED BUv OUT/LEVERAGED
RECAPITALIZATION) 29 (2009) (Ger.).
81. See id at 328 et seq , who favors a more flexible cashing out barricr.
82 AlFM directive, supr3a note 2, at art. 21(2).
83. Id. at art 21(6)
84 Id. at art. 21(4). 21(10)
85 Id at art. 21(15).
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will also lead to an adjustment of business models and compensation structure
in the custodian banks." These costs will ultimately fall back on the AIF's
investors.
IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. Measures Undertaken by the ESMA
The directive's legislative procedure is parallel to that of the Lamfalussy
Procedure introduced in 2002, which is intended to make the European
legislative procedure faster and more efficient." However, the additional
levels of regulation introduced by the Lamfalussy Procedure also increase the
complexity of capital market law. In total, six regulating levels are to be
considered." In addition to national laws, ordinances and the BaFin's
secondary legal duties, three levels on the European side exist." On a first
level, the European Parliament enacts framework directives (level 1
measures). The AIFM directive, issued in June 2011, was such a framework
directive. It does not provide definite sanctioning mechanisms for its breach.
The directive only states: "[m]ember States should lay down rules on penalties
applicable to infringements of this Directive and ensure that they are
implemented. The penalties should be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive."9 0 Consequently, the next levels of regulation are immensely
important. Many relevant issues of the framework directive are vaguely
worded and refer to the so-called implementing rules. These are technical
implementing measures introduced by the implementing directives (level 2
measures). They are enacted by the European Commission and the European
86. See Christoph Schmitt, Die Rolle einer Verwahrstelle nach der AIFM-Richtlinie, 64
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE KREDITWESEN, 246, 250 (2011) (considers the liability rules exaggerated
since they go beyond the UC ITS rules).
87. Final Report ofthe Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation ofEuropean Securities Markets,
(Feb. 1 5, 200 1), available at http://cc.curopa.cu/internalmarket/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-
report-wise-men_de.pdf [hereinafter Comm. of Wise Men].
88. THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europdischen
Finanzmarktaufsichtsstruktur Ein systematischer Vergletch der Rating- VO (EG) Nr. 1060/2009 mit der
geplanten ESMA-VO, 8 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 285, 285 (2010) (Ger.).
89. THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, Vollharmonisierung im Kapitalmarkirecht-ZurRegelungskompetenz
nationaler Gerichte und Parlamente, in VOLLHARMONISIERUNG IM PRIVATRECHT, DIE KONZEPTION DER
RICHTLINIE AM SC HEIDEWEG? 253 (Beate Gscll & Carsten Herresthal eds., 2009) (Ger.); MOLLERS, supra
note 88.
90. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at recital 75.
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Parliament after hearing the respective panels." On December 2, 2010, the
European Commission sent an inquiry concerning the technical advice of the
CESR/ESMA's implementing measures. Another inquiry concerning the
AIFM directive is expected to be submitted by September 2, 2011 .12 Finally,
on the third level, the ESMA, as the CESR's successor, issues
recommendations and guidelines (level 3 measures) concerning the common
regulatory tasks, and help to ensure a homogeneous implementation of the
first two levels' provisions).93
These recommendations and guidelines are secondary sources of law, and
are legally binding, although in a limited way.94 National agencies must
undertake all necessary efforts to follow the ESMA's recommendations and
guidelines.95 If agencies do not concern themselves with the rules, they must
provide an explanation." In certain cases, the ESMA also has decisional
authority over the national agencies.97 The AIFM directive transfers rules from
the ESMA regulation and provides a clear decision authority connected to a
shaming sanction for the national regulatory agency." Finally, the ESMA's
guidelines and recommendations are factually binding." Since the directive
is explained in detail only on the third level, the democratic legitimacy is
questionable, as the European Parliament is bypassed."'o
91. Klaus U. Schmolke, Die Einbeziehung des Konitologieverfahrens in den Lafalussy-Proze.ss
Zur Forderung des Europaiischen Parlaments nach mehr Entscheidungsteilhabe, 41 EUROPARECHT, 432,
433 (2006) (Ger.).
92. Provisional Request to CliSR for Technical Advice on Possible Level 2 Measures Concerning
the Future Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (EC), Ref, Arcs (2010) 892960 (Dec. 2,
2010)2.
93 MOLLERS, supra note 89, at 252.
94 For more on the duty to concern oneself, presumption effect and situations oftrust for secondary
sources of law, THOMAS M.J MOLLERS, Sekundare Rechtsquellen-Eine Skizze zur Vermutungswirkung
und ion Vertrauensschut: bet Urteden, Verwaltungsvorschriften und privater Normsetzing, in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERBERT BUCHNER ZUM 70. Geburtstag, 649 et seq. (Jobst-Hubertus Baucr, Michael
Kort, Thomas M.J. Mollers & Bcrnd Sandmann eds., 2008) (Ger 2); THOMAS M.J. MOLI ERS, GELTUNG UND
FAKTIZITAT VON STANDARDS, 143 etseq (2009) (Ger.).
95. Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 ofthe European Parliament and ofthe Council of24 Nov. 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending
Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [hereinafter ESMA].
96. Id.
97. The directive power in case of differing option, ESMA regulation, id at art. 19, and in case of
crisis, ESMA regulation, id. at art. 18, are most relevant.
98. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at arts. 38(5), 38(7)
99. MOLLERS, supra note 88, at 285 (mentioning also that neither the final report of the wise men
for the Lamfalussy procedure and the CESR's self-image assume it to be legally binding).
100. See also BVI, Comments to the Draft EU Directive on Alternatine Investment Fund Managers
(AIFM) 2 (Aug. 28, 2009).
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The AIFM directive's degree of harmonization is not defined
completely."o' Generally, the Lamfalussy Procedure ensures a homogenous
legislation and application of law.1 02 The fact that the AIFM rules are
implemented in accordance with the Lamfalussy Procedure appears to speak
in favor of a full harmonization. Indicators for a full harmonization can be
found, for example, in the rules concerning starting capital.'1 3 Other sections,
however, point toward minimum harmonization, according to which the
member states can deviate from the top.'04 Most rules, however, do not leave
much room for an implementation by member states. Therefore, the general
rule is full harmonization. However, the question about the national
legislature's competence to concretize remains open for individual cases.'
2. Sanctions
Since EU directives are not directly applicable (excluding vertical third-
party application), the national implementing acts must still be awaited.'
Only these will contain sanctions that are legally binding. Discussion papers
can be expected at the end of 2012 since the directive must be implemented
by July 22, 2013.1" Since national rules need to be interpreted in conformity
with European law, the AIFM directive's requirements are of immense
practical relevance already. Capital market law knows sanctions from public,
criminal and civil law.' The AIFM directive resorts to them. For example,
Article 48 of the AIFM directive describes administrative sanctions. A breach
101. For the basics of full harmonization, see MOLLERS, supra note 88, at 247 et seq.; MOLLERS,
supra note 3, at 408; for the question of minimum or full harmonization at the transparency directive, see
KLAUS U. SCHMOLKE & HOLGER FLEISCHER, Die Reform der Transparenzrichtlinie- Mindest- oder
Vollharmonisierung der kapitalmarktrechtlichen Beteiligungspubliztadt?, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 1241 (2010) (Ger).
102. Comm of Wise Men, supra note 87, at 46.
103. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 9 (according to which a deviation from no 6 is only
possible for no. 3).
104. E.g., id. art. 21(3) (the wording "[i]n addition, Member States may allow..." implies minimum
harmonization); see also id. art. 22(3); id. art. 24(4) (contains discretionary provisions).
105. MOLLERS, supra note 88, at 271.
106. The ECJ interprets Art 289 AEUV in a way that allows the court to apply directives directly if
member states did not implement the directive orderly
107. AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 66.
108. Sce THOMAS M.J. MOLLERS, Anlegerschutz im System des Kapitalmarktrechts
Rechtsgrundlagen und Ausblicke, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24.
AUGUST 2010: UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND VERANTWORTUNG 2247,2259 (Stefan v. Grundmann, Brigitte
Haar & Hanno Merkt eds., 2009) (Ger.), on the problem of legal implementation in German capital markets
law.
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of national rules can be punished by taking back the AIF's authorization, with
criminal proceedings and with administrative measures against the responsible
persons. These measures are to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.'O9
As an additional deterring measure, the sanctions are to be published if this
does not put the financial market's stability and investors' interests at too high
a risk.'" These rigorous sanctioning options are meant to meet a problem
common to capital markets law. Mere financial sanctions are usually only a
small incentive to change behavior. By comparison, the skimming of excess
profits also appears to be a useful instrument.'"
3. Actual Enforcement by the BaFin
Effective enforcement of the new requirements poses a great challenge.
The large amount of transparency requirements makes effective supervision
of systemic risks appear questionable. Suspicion of information overload,
already criticized in capital markets law, is far more pressing." 2 The amount
of information disclosed will pose more problems to the agency than its
complexity. The BaFin already describes itself as "hopelessly understaffed."" 3
It is therefore unclear how not only the authorization, but also its periodical
control can be done effectively. The financial regulatory authorities need to
be extended in order to fulfil the goal of an effective audit." 4
109 AIFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 48(1).
110. Id at art 48(3); sec Thomas M.J. Mbllers, Effizienz als MaJ3stab des Kapitalmarktrechts, Die
Verwending empirischer ind 6konomischer Argumente zur Begriindung zivil-, stra- und ofentlich-
rechilicher Sanktionen, 208 Archiv fir die civilistische Praxis 1, 15 (2008), on the so-called Shaming.
11. MELANIE BINNINGFR, GEWINNABSCHOPFUNG ALs KAPITALMARKTRECHTLICHE SANKTION,
SYSTEMATIK UND KONZEPTION EINER GEWINNABSCHOPFUNG IM KAPITALMARKTRECHT, DARGESTELLT AM
BEISPIEL DES DEUTSCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN INSIDERRFC HTs 373 (2010) (Ger.).
112. Thomas M.J. Mbllcrs& Eva Kernchen, Information Overload am Kapitalmarkt-PlddoVer cur
Einfithrung eines Kurzfinanzheru his aul empirischer, psvchologischer und rechtsvergleichender Basis,
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, at 1, 26 (2011) (Ger.).
113. See Anne Scith, Machikampf ums Widilen im Drec k, SPIEGEL ONLINE (July 3, 2009), available
at http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,633860,00.htmli BaFin wariit vor Uberlastung diirch HRE-
Ausschuss, SPIEGEL ONLINE (May 18, 2009), available at http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/
0,1518,625605,00.htm. Lately, the number of additional employees has risen, but is still regarded as too
low. See Oberste Finanzaulseher bekommen Ver1starkung, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Nov. 23, 2010) (Ger.),
availableat http://www.spiegel.dc/wirtschaft/0,1518,730679,00.html.
114. It is unclear who would bear these additional costs AIFMs could become subject to fees: for
example, when applying for authorization
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V. CONCLUSION AND ESTIMATION OF CONSEQUENCES
Hedge funds and private equity companies are not said to have triggered
the financial crisis."'5 However, the sector faces many changes due to the
much-discussed AIFM directive. The regulation's introduction of a uniform
European regulation of alternative investment funds is to be welcomed as it
prevents a race to the bottom. However, the balancing of investor protection
and functionality protection is a great challenge asking a lot of the European
legislator. After many changes were made, a directive is now in place which
meets the "one size fits all" criticism with many detailed rules.'' This
directive, however, is very confusing, and its impact remains to be seen
especially concerning the large number of vague legal terms and references to
implementing measures.
Even now it can certainly be foreseen that the regulating instruments to
be introduced will lead to high compliance costs.'' Seen from an economical
point of view, these costs lower the directive's benefits. A better protection of
hedge fund investors'" is met by higher costs, which will result in lower
returns. Most professional investors will not welcome costs to this extent. The
additional duties of disclosure connected to the directive increase the risk of
information overload and competitive disadvantage. Additionally, a
coordination of the MiFiD and the UCITS is desirable in order to avoid
competitive disadvantages between banks, UCITS investment funds and
alternative investment funds."' Finally, the authorization of alternative
115. Thus is the result of a recent study by the British regulatory authority Financial Services
Authority, ASSESSING POSSIBLE SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC RISK FROM HEDGE FUNDS, (Feb. 2010), available
athttp://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/hedgefunds.pdf., see also Sachverstindigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Das Erreichte nicht verspielen 131 (2007/08) (Ger.).
116. The criticism of "one size fits all" addresses the problem of various funds (including hedge funds
and closed funds) being covered by the same regulatory system. See Zentraler Kreditausschuss,
Commentary, Proposal on a Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, Sept. 25, 2009, available
at http://www.zka-onlinc.dc/uploads/media/bzkaEUBassiProposal-for-aDirective
onAlternativeInvestmentFund Managers.pdf, at 1, 2.
117. The EU Commission also sees these costs. Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives, at 8, SEC (2009) 577
(Sept. 30, 2009). EU-Kommission, Executive Summary on the Impact Assessment, Sept. 30, 2009. SEC
577, at 8 (2009).
118. The directive is a huge step for investor protection in hedge funds. A scandal like the Kiener one
could probably have been prevented by audit duties as are now required for authorization. Schdnberger,
supra note 53.
119. See also Opinion of the European Central Bank, 2009 OJ (C 272) 1, 2.
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investment funds will hopefully not lead to a race to the bottom within
Europe. 120
The AIFM directive must be implemented in national law by 2013. The
ESMA, introduced as a regulatory agency in early 2011, is of special
importance in this context. It will not only define the framework of the
directive's exact provisions, but also monitor transparency requirements as
data is registered. '2 In Germany, changes are necessary mainly in the
Investment Act and the Securities Trading Act. Until then, private equity
funds should have implemented AIFM standards in the best possible way in
order to avoid competitive disadvantages. Existing AIFMs then need to apply
for authorization within one year.1 2 2
Furthermore, the AIFM standards can be expected to prevail as a seal of
quality in the market. After all, the AIFM directive's requirements are
important as well for private equity funds to which the directive does not
apply due to their size. They should orient themselves by the AIFM directive
so as to avoid disadvantages in placement.
120. The member states have some discretionary power when authorizing AlFMs. AIFM directive,
supra note 2, at art. 6(4) and at art. 8(4).
121. European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association, AIFMD Essentials, Dec. 2010, at 1,
16, http://www.avco.at/upload/medialibrary/FINALEVCAAIFMDEssentials January 2011 .pdf
122. AlFM directive, supra note 2, at art. 61(1).
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